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Abstract: Analogical arguments have varying degrees of similarity, which helps us to understand their varying 
degrees of strength. Three-wise similarity claims – case C1 is more similar to C2 than it is to C3 – will be used to 
argue that assessing degrees of strength is both important and common in analogical arguments. Making the degree 
of argument strength a function of, among other things, degree of similarity, means the arguments are best 
understood non-deductively. 
 





Arguments from analogy are often construed or interpreted as involving two cases, a source and 
a target. The source is the case that we are arguing from, and the target is the case about which 
we are trying to draw some conclusion. Where the Ci are cases, this kind of argument claims that 
C2 is like C1, so C2 should be treated like C1. This paper will examine a kind of case-based 
argumentation that involves three cases. The claim in these kinds of arguments is that C3 is more 
like C1 than C2 is. The focus will be on this kind of claim and how it arises in legal and ethical 
argumentation. 
 Be they lawyers in court or participants to an ethical dispute, consider two agents or 
arguers (the Ai) having a disagreement about some case. Agent or arguer A1 says that the 
disputed case C3 is (relevantly) similar to C1 and should be treated as h1, just as C1 is. A2 says 
that C3 is (relevantly) similar to C2 and should be treated as h2, just as C2 is. (The hi are the 
relevant legal or ethical classifications at issue.) A1 may counter with a three-wise similarity 
claim: C3 is more similar to C1 than it is to C2, because…, so C3 should be treated as h1. This 
kind of three-wise comparison of cases arises in a perfectly natural way in the process of arguing 
about two-wise comparisons. Below, it will be argued that these three-wise claims are well 
understood in terms of the degree of similarity that holds between cases, and that this degree of 
similarity is usefully understood in non-deductive terms. Guarini (2004) has argued that a point 
in favour of non-deductive reconstructions of analogical arguments is that they help us to 
understand degrees of strength in analogical arguments involving two cases. Govier (1985, 1999, 
2002), Juthe (2015), Postema (2007) and Sunstein (1993, 1996, 1999, 2000) also have favoured 
non-deductive reconstructions. On the analyses provided by Brewer (1996) and Shecaira (2013), 
arguments from analogy are a two-part complex, where the first part involves either the 
induction or abduction of a rule, and the second part a deductive application of a rule. It will be 
argued that while this may allow for some assessment of the degrees of strength, it may not allow 
for a complete assessment of degrees of strength. The degrees of strength in arguments from 
analogy are a function of, among other things, the similarity and differences in the cases being 
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compared. The point will be that deduction is not required to make sense of that, and it may even 
get in the way of helping us to understand that. 
 
2. Strategies for understanding three-wise similarity arguments 
 
In previous work (Guarini 2010) I used notation that treated three-wise similarity comparisons as 
an instance of a four wise comparison: C3,C1 > C3,C2, which would read as C3 is more like C1 
than C3 is like C2. Timothy Williamson (1988) has argued at length that three-wise comparisons 
are best treated as a special case of four-wise comparisons, a position for which I have great 
sympathy. Treating three-wise similarity as an implicit instance of four-wise comparisons helps 
us to see some strategies for how to understand and evaluate arguments that have such a 
comparison as their conclusion. Here is one strategy. Provide considerations in favour of the 
similarity between C3 and C1; provide considerations for the differences between C3 and C2; 
conclude that C3 and C1 should be treated in the same way and that C3 and C2 should not. On the 
strongest possible version of this approach, relevant differences are not considered in the first 
pair; relevant similarities are not considered in the second pair, and the comparison is not 
multivalent or a matter of degrees. A different approach would look at both the relevant 
similarities and differences of each pair of cases (C3,C1 and C3,C2) and treat the comparison 
between them as being a matter of degree. This later approach will be the one endorsed herein, 
and it will be argued that a non-deductive reconstruction of such arguments provides a plausible 
way of understanding the degrees of similarity at work in them. 
 
3. From two-wise to three-wise analogical arguments 
 
Let us consider the well-worn example of Judith Thomson’s famous violinist. We will take the 
target case, C1, to be the issue of the moral permissibility of abortion when a woman has become 
pregnant as a result of rape. We will consider a series of possible source cases. 
 
C2: you are kidnapped, forcibly hooked up to a famous violinist to filter his blood, 
and you have to stay hooked up indefinitely. The violinist staying alive is 
dependent on you staying connected. The claim is that it is permissible to 
disconnect yourself from the violinist even if doing so guarantees the death of the 
violinist. 
 
There is a rather significant difference between C2 and C1: in the case of pregnancy, the 
dependency and physical burden last nine months; in C2, the dependency and the burden are 
indefinite. We can consider a modified case. 
 
C3: you are kidnapped, forcibly hooked up to a famous violinist to filter his blood, 
and you have to stay hooked up for nine months. The violinist staying alive is 
dependent on you staying connected. The claim is that it is permissible to 





While the duration of the burden has been better controlled for, there may be other morally 
relevant considerations. For example, if the violinist is conscious, then he could violate the 
kidnapped victim’s privacy in a way that fetus could not. This might lead to still another variant. 
 
C4: you are kidnapped, forcibly hooked up to a famous violinist to filter his blood, 
and you have to stay hooked up for nine months. The violinist staying alive is 
dependent on you staying connected, and the violinist will be unconscious the 
entire time. The claim is that it is permissible to disconnect yourself from the 
violinist even if doing so guarantees the death of the violinist. 
 
Here are some plausible similarity (S) claims 
 
S1: C3 is more like C1 than C2 is like C1. 
S2: C4 is more like C1 than C3 is like C1. 
S3: C4 is more like C1 than C2 is like C1. 
 
Indeed, if we wanted to, we could even modify the original target case (C1) to come up with 
something like this. 
 
C5: a women has become pregnant as the result of rape and is largely bedridden 
for the duration of the pregnancy. The claim is that an abortion would be morally 
permissible. 
 
The addition of being bedridden makes the case even more similar to the violinist cases since the 
assumption in those cases is usually that the person connected to the violinist is stuck in the 
hospital, in bed, and is hooked up to machines. 
 
This would allow us to say 
 
S4: C4 is more like C5 than C2 is like C1. 
 
I will spare the reader other possible similarity comparisons. S4 allows us to see what a full four-
wise similarity comparison looks like. While the form of S1 through S3 is four-wise – i.e. there 
are four variables slots – only three cases are compared. S4 has four slots and four different 
cases. 
Similarity between the cases comes in degrees. If analogical arguments are understood in 
terms of degrees of similarity between the cases, then we should understand those arguments as 
having degrees of strength. Someone might argue like this. 
 
In C1 (pregnancy case), force is used to make one life dependent on another. 
In C2 (first violinist case), force is used to make one life dependant on another. 
In C4 (a more refined violinist case), force is used to make one life dependent on 
another. 
In spite of a relevant similarity between C1 and C2, there are some relevant 
differences: the duration of physical burden is indefinite in C2, and the source of 
the physical burden is also the source of a privacy violation. 
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C4 does not have these relevant differences. 
Therefore, C4 is more like C1 than C2 is like C1. 
 
This kind of three-wise argument shows us something important about two-wise arguments: it 
shows that the two-wise arguments admit of degrees of strength, and it is suggestive of the 
possibility that the degrees of strength in the two-wise arguments is a function of, among other 
things, the degree of similarity between the cases. Consider a series of abbreviated arguments. 
 
A1: C1 is relevantly similar to C2, so C1 should be treated like C2. 
A2: C1 is relevantly similar to C3, so C1 should be treated like C3. 
A3: C1 is relevantly similar to C4, so C1 should be treated like C4. 
 
A3 is stronger than A2; A2 is stronger than A1. This is true even if all three arguments are, in the 
end, bad arguments. Arguments can fail in more less spectacular ways. Arguments can also 
succeed in more or less convincing ways, so the claims about argument strength hold if all the 
arguments are good. One more possibility is that some of the arguments succeed, and some fail, 
and even here the claims about differential strength hold. How is all of this possible? 
 
Let us say that we understand two-wise arguments in the following way. 
 
A Non-deductive reconstruction: 
C1 has features f1, f2, . . . fn. 
C1 has or is classified as h1 in virtue of f1, f2, . . . fn. 
C2 has features f1, f2, . . . fn. 
Therefore, C2 has h1. 
 
Pretty clearly, the premises do not deductively entail the conclusion. While differences are not 
mentioned, they certainly could be brought up in the argumentation process, and they certainly 
could be a part of assessing the argument’s strength. The considerations or relevant similarities 
(f1, f2, . . . fn) that contribute to a particular classification or treatment (h1) of a case may vary in 
significance and number, and they may interact with relevant differences (which may also vary 
in significance and number) in complex ways. It is possible for there to be relevant differences 
that do not outweigh the relevant similarities, but the number and significance of the similarities 
and differences could affect the strength of the overall comparison; alternatively, the relevant 
similarities might be outweighed by the relevant differences, but the number and significance of 
those differences and similarities could affect the overall weakness of the argument. An account 
of analogical argument should not mask or block these considerations. Indeed, the above schema 
captures a moment in the process of analogical argumentation. It does not make reference to 
differences, but it does not block their consideration in a way that allows for considerations of 
degrees of strength. A reply to the above might consist of something of the form: 
 
C2 has features d1, d2,…dn that contribute to it being treated differently than C1. 
The di outweigh the fi. 




There is variation in the extent to which various di may or may not outweigh various fi, and this 
allows for varying degrees of similarity between cases, and that similarity can be used in the 
assessment of argument strength, leading to varying degrees of argument strength. 
 
4. To deduce or not to deduce? 
 
Can a non-deductive or monotonic approach to reconstructing analogical arguments allow for 
degrees of strength in virtue of degrees of similarity? Guarini (2004) does not deny that there can 
be variation in argument strength in virtue of variation in acceptability in the premises, and it 
will not be denied here. The point being argued for is that when it comes to arguments from 
analogy, some of the variation in argument strength comes from the variation in the overall 
similarity or difference of the cases being considered. 
Here is a “deductive” schema that captures ideas from Brewer (1996) and related ideas in 
Shecairia (2013). 
 
1. One or more source cases have f1, f2, . . . fn and has or is classified as h1. 
2. P is the best explanation or justification of why cases having f1, f2, . . . fn also 
have or are classified as h1. 
3. The target case has f1, f2, . . . fn. 
4. Therefore, from 2 and 3, the target case has or is classified as h1. 
 
The move from 1 to 2 is abductive (or could be rendered inductive, depending on the details of 
the formulation). The move from 2 and 3 to 4 is deductive, and it is this deductive moment in 
Brewer and Shecaira (see Waller 2001 for a similar variant) that is being questioned here. 
Imagine we have two lawyers citing cases. The target or disputed case is T. 
 
The prosecutor says that X1, X2, … Xn all have f1, f2, . . . fn and have been treated 
as h1. Since T has f1, f2, . . . fn, it should be treated as h1. 
 
The defense lawyer says that cases Y1, Y2, … Yn have g1, g2, . . . gn and have been 
treated as not h1. Since T has g1, g2, . . . gn, it should be treated as not h1. 
 
There is nothing in what has been stated so far that requires a deductive reconstruction, but let us 
see what happens if we reconstruct these positions using the deductive schema mentioned above. 
Let us assume that all other things are equal. In other words, we will say that the pedigree 
of the source cases is the same for both sets of sources (i.e. the level of court deciding them is the 
same, and the confidence of the decisions is the same). If we use the deductive schema from 
above, the arguments from the prosecutor and defense look as follows. 
 
Prosecutor 
1. X1, X2, … Xn all have f1, f2, . . . fn and have been treated as h1. 
2. All cases that have f1, f2, . . . fn should be treated as h1. 
3. T has f1, f2, . . . fn. 






1. Y1, Y2, … Yn all have g1, g2, . . . gn and have been treated as not h1. 
2. All cases that have g1, g2, . . . gn should be treated as not h1. 
3. T has g1, g2, . . . gn. 
4. Therefore, T should be treated as not h1. 
 
Again, we are assuming that the sources, the Xi and Yi are of equal pedigree, and we will even 
assume the same number of sources have been cited in each argument. The point here is not that 
things are likely to happen exactly like this in real life. Rather, it is to undertake a kind of 
controlled thought experiment where the influence of certain factors are controlled to see if this 
sort of reconstruction can account for all the factors contributing to degrees of strength. Given 
what we have said, the second premise in each argument is equally strong, and we will assume 
that the third claim is true and equally well supported in both arguments. Of course, claim 4 
follows deductively in both, so it looks like we should say that both arguments are equally 
strong. Perhaps they are. The problem is that there does not appear to be any option to say 
anything else given the assumptions made. The reason is that arguments are reconstructed in a 
way that refers to similarities and blocks the consideration of differences as counting in a way 
that might weaken the similarity comparison being made. For example, say that there are several 
relevant and weighty differences between the Xi and T, and few or no such differences between 
the Yi and T. It would then be reasonable to say that the defense’s argument is stronger than the 
prosecutor’s argument because the defense’s sources are more similar to the target and the 
prosecutor’s sources. The non-deductive approach mentioned above can allow for this. The 
deductive approach considered here fails to account for degrees of similarity and degrees of 
strength because after the similarities are mentioned and we get to premise 2, everything works 
by deduction, and there is no room for (unmentioned differences between the cases) to have an 
impact on the assessment of the overall similarity and difference between the cases. 
A possible response to this line of thought is to reformulate the deductive reconstruction 
so as to somehow allow for a fuller consideration of degrees of strength. Considering and 
replying to such alternatives awaits a fuller, more developed version of the ideas considered 




Much has been skipped over. The works of Brewer and Shecaira contain many genuine insights, 
but for reasons of time, I have focussed on points of difference between their views and the 
position defended herein. I do not want to give the impression that deduction has no role to play 
in a broader understanding of analogical reasoning and argumentation, but a proper exploration 
of that role is beyond the scope of this work. The scholarship of Bermejo-Luque (2012) and 
Andre Juthe (2015) was not engaged herein and awaits discussion in a fuller treatment of the 
subject matters discussed in this paper. Finally, the analogies treated in this work are 
linguistically articulated. There are profoundly interesting questions about the nature of visual 
analogies as well as analogies that make use of other modalities, such as auditory analogies. 
“This new piece of music is so similar to that older piece of music that the new piece constitutes 
copyright infringement” – this is similarity-based reasoning, and the cases (i.e. pieces of music 
being compared) admit of degrees of similarity, and the arguments involving comparisons of 
such cases admit of degrees of strength. How the analogies of different modalities may or may 
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not be related to one another, and the extent to which full linguistic articulation would or would 
not be required, is a separate project altogether. I flag it not because it could possibly be 
discussed here or in the expanded version of this paper, but because questions regarding degrees 
of similarity, degrees of strength, and n-wise comparisons will likely recur in the discussion of 
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